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   Abstract.  The orange juice market is a “weather market” because of its high 
geographical concentration and the natural characteristics of orange trees. A few hours of 
a freeze in Florida is enough to cause a supply shock to the orange juice market. How do 
oligopolistic firms react to supply shocks – do they become more collusive or more 
competitive? This paper empirically examines the proposition and finds that the level of 
market power of orange juice firms decreases significantly, and the market becomes 
 more competitive during supply shocks even though prices rise. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
        The orange juice market is characterized by high concentration not only because 
nearly 90 percent of the orange juice in the US market is produced in Florida, but also 
because few associations and firms control the supply chain. In addition, the natural 
characteristics of orange trees and freezes make supply shocks possible and cause price 
fluctuations in the orange juice market (Roll, 1984). How do oligopolistic firms react to 
supply shocks – do they act more collusively or more competitively? In other words, how 
does the firms’ market power change while prices rise due to supply shocks from a 
freeze? Market power is usually consider to be manifested when firms charge higher 
prices than prices in competitive markets; however, a higher price does not necessarily 
mean higher market power, since other factors such as supply shocks could shift prices. 
Few scholars disagree with the statement that a firm will charge a higher (than 
competitive market) price if a firm is a monopoly in a market. According to this logic, 
many markets are served by a small number of firms with non-negligible market power 
(Tirole et al., 1988).  However, not all models support the proposition. In the Cournot 
model of non-cooperative oligopolistic competition on quantity, oligopolistic firms tend 
to charge a higher-than-competitive-market price and exhibit some market power. But in 
the Bertrand mode of non-cooperative oligopolistic competition on price, firms compete 
in prices and they have no reason to cooperate with each other if they want to maximize   3
their profit; the market would be a perfect-competition market even though just two firms 
share the market.  
In the early empirical “structure, conduct, performance” (SCP) studies in the 
1950s to the 1970s on oligopolies’ market power, researchers used industry-level data to 
draw inferences about the relationship between the structure of an industry (in particular, 
its concentration) and its profitability.  However, as has been frequently noted in the past 
decade, the use of that methodology is on the wane because it lacks rigorous 
microeconomic foundations. 
The next generation of empirical studies began in the early 1980s. The new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) school started with researchers’ use of  
structural econometric modeling to identify the oligopoly solution to distinguish Cournot, 
Bertrand, and collusion situations (Bresnahan, 1982). Porter (1983) employed this 
framework to study the cartel stability of JEC (the Joint Executive Committee, a 19
th 
century railroad cartel) from 1880 to1886. His model tried to distinguish what caused the 
unexpectedly low prices: deviation from collusion or demand shocks. However, the study 
did not explain why the firms deviate from previous collusion. Bresnahan (1987) 
examined the price war in the (concentrated) American automobile industry in 1955 and 
found collusion in 1954 and 1956, but competition in 1955. But he did not explain the 
latter, thus what triggered the price war in 1955. The common points of this class of 
studies are: (1) specifying and estimating structural demand and supply equations and 
econometric detection of market power that depends on estimation of a term for the 
demand elasticity in supply functions.(Bresnahan, 1987);  (2) the assumption of  Cournot 
competition during the cooperative periods and Bertrand competition otherwise (in non-  4
cooperative periods); identification of these two periods is a prerequisite to estimating 
market power; (3) failure by most of the studies to give reasons why the firms deviate 
from the equilibrium (collusive or competitive).  
       In the past decade, estimating supply and demand systems with product 
differentiation based on the Bertrand model became the “heart and soul” of NEIO 
research. This methodology started from BLP (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes,1995) 
developing techniques to estimate demand and cost parameters for a class of oligopolistic 
differentiated products in US automobile markets. The key idea is the derivation of the 
demand function from the consumers’ indirect utility function for a small number of 
product characteristics to avoid the requirement of too many observations to estimate 
demand functions. Nevo (2001) employed the BLP framework to measure market power 
in the American ready-to-eat cereal industry and found that firms’ behavior in the 
industry is consistent with a non-collusion regime despite the high price-cost margin 
(PCM). The reasons for a high PCM are the firms’ abilities to maintain a portfolio of 
differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality.  
Sutton (1991) notes that producing differentiated products means a single firm 
could have some monopoly power in a particular product market (differentiated in space, 
brand, taste, or quality). Substitution goods would restrict the level of the market power if 
product differentiation is not so large (like different brands of orange juice).  Thus, 
elasticities of substitution are crucial to a firm’s market power. For a firm to maintain a 
portfolio of differentiated products, it must reduce the elasticities of substitution of its 
rivals’ products and gain more power in the particular market. The more a firm can 
differentiate its products from others, the higher market power the firm achieves.   5
Meanwhile, firms could get even higher markups if they agree to collude in an aggregate 
market (including many differentiated but similar products
2). However, distinguishing 
whether the markup increase is from product differentiation or from collusion is not 
straightforward.  
        In this paper, we focus on supply shocks to identify the market power change in the 
orange juice market
3 since potential collusion could be broken up or weakened during the 
supply shocks. The main difference between this study and Porter’s study is that we 
consider freezes as implicit indicators and reasons for changes in firms’ behavior. In 
addition, we believe firms would deviate from the Nash-Cournot equilibrium only if 
something happened like a freeze
4. We focus on estimating the market power change, 
while in Porter’s study the market power level is constant over the collusive regime (θ) 
and the non-collusive regime (0). We estimate market power change by introducing the 
interaction term of freeze and an indicator for market power, controlling for other factors. 
We identify the change and get our main conclusion: the level of market power in the 
                                                 
2 For example, the fruit juice market includes orange juice, apple juice etc.; they are 
different but similar. The products are always different: different brands, locations, 
package, flavor, materials even timing.  Each differentiation could be taken advantage of 
by firms to gain quasi-monopoly power in a specific market.  
3 Here, we assume the orange juice market is a homogenous market and the difference 
between the different oranges for processing is relative little.   
4 We also assume the supply shocks only come from the freezes. However, other market 
circumstance changes (for example tariff reduction) could cause supply shocks; however, 
we assume the effect of supply shocks is relatively small compared with freezes.    6
orange juice market decreases significantly during the supply shocks even though prices 
rise. The main difficulty in estimation of the simultaneous functions is they are nonlinear 
in endogenous variables. We use 2SLS to estimate the simultaneous functions and get 
consistent estimators.  
 
2. The Orange Juice Industry 
  
  The US is the number two producer, and the number one market of orange juice 
in the world; it accounts for 40% of world consumption. The second largest market is 
Europe, accounting for 30% (USDA, 2004). US consumers mainly drink their oranges: in 
2000/01, about 85% of all oranges in the United States were consumed as juice. Orange 
juice is 60% of all fruit juice consumed in the US. 80% of oranges produced go into 
juice. In turn, Florida makes 80% of that juice (Pollack et al. 2003). Around 95% of 
orange production in Florida is purchased by processors to make juice (Florida 
Department of Citrus, 2003).  
Since orange juice production is highly concentrated geographically, the supply of 
orange juice is very sensitive to the weather of the production area (southern and central 
Florida). Orange trees can not withstand a few hours of hard freezing temperatures
5. 
From 1835 to 1996, there were 36 recorded freezes in Florida, including four catastrophic 
freezes (1835, 1895, 1899, and 1962), 20 severe freezes, and 12 moderate freezes 
(Attaway, 1997, 2004). Most freezes caused supply shocks. For instance, in 1895, almost 
all orange trees in Florida were killed to the ground on February 8, production declined 
                                                 
5. Hard freezes are defined as 3 hours or more of temperatures below 27°F.   7
by 97% and 16 years passed before it recovered to its previous level (Roll, 1984). The 
worst freeze in the past century occurred in 1962, when Florida orange production 
dropped from 113.4 million boxes (1961-1962) to 55.1 million boxes (1963-1964) and 
orange production had not recovered to previous level until 1967
6.  Several serious 
freezes occurred in the 1980s
7 and caused the orange production to decrease from 206 
million boxes (juice production, 1200 million gallons) in the 1979 to 104 million boxes 
(juice production, 622 million gallons) in 1984 (USDA, 2003). 
Orange processing into juice is concentrated economically, while the orange 
farming sector is concentrated organizationally. There were 7,653 citrus farms in Florida 
in 2002. Most of the growers are members of a few associations such as FCM (Florida 
Citrus Mutual) which represents Florida citrus growers on issues affecting their business. 
FCM is the largest and exerts a strong influence on the conditions of the market. FCM 
started in 1948 with 6000 members; in 1949/50 it established minimum orange prices, but 
this price fixing was denounced as a violation of the spirit of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
in 1952, and thenceforth it shifted its role to providing market information and forecasts, 
and lobbying at state and federal levels on behalf of growers.  In 1963 and 1970, FCM 
was instrumental in preventing tariff reductions on oranges, amid rising competition from 
Argentina and Brazil. In the 1970s FCM negotiated for a higher price for juice with the 
Nixon Price Commission during the wage-price controls. In the 1980s and 1990s FCM 
continued this active role. For example, in 1987 FCM convinced the US Department of 
                                                 
6 Orange production recovery after hard freezes usually takes 3-7 years.  
7 Hard freezes occurred in 1983, 1985, 1989.    8
Commerce that Brazil had been dumping FCOJ in the US market. FCM lobbied to 
maintain tariffs in NAFTA and GATT in the late 1980s and 1990s 
(www.flcitrusmutual.com). 
By contrast, there were 18 processors in Florida in the 2000-2001 season (Spreen 
and Fernandes, Jr., 2000). To the extent processors cooperate, it offsets FCM (growers) 
market power, and vice versa. Among the processors, bulk processors dominate the 
market; the other kind of processors are called marketing processors which buy bulk juice 
and pack it under their own label.  The next stage of the supply chain is shipping bulk 
“frozen concentrated orange juice” (FCOJ) (a product form introduced in the mid 1940s) 
to the local packers which then identify and ship to targeted markets. Before packing, the 
concentrated juice is usually reconstituted by adding the same amount of water. Then the 
distributors are responsible for shipping the packaged juice to wholesalers or retailers. 
The other kind of juice, “not from concentrated juice” (NFC) (introduced in the mid 
1990s), usually is packaged in producing areas and shipped to wholesalers and retailers 
directly. The cost of shipping FCOJ is much cheaper than shipping NFC
8, so it is not 
surprising that NFC is more expensive than FCOJ.  
The industry is quite concentrated at the wholesale and retail levels (Binkley et al. 
2002). Many grocery marketing areas had four-firm concentration ratios near or above 90 
percent in both the wholesale and retail stage of the grocery marketing system.  
                                                 
8 Most orange juice is transported in the form of bulk FCOJ to packing plants throughout 
the United States, since shipping volumes are 5-6 times smaller with concentrate than 
with reconstituted juice. 
   9
A final contextual point is that the industry is protected by a tariff. It was 
introduced in the early 1930s as a part of the Smith-Hawley Act. It successfully 
prevented the foreign (mainly Brazilian) orange juice from entering the US market; that 
tariff is under fire by the Brazilians in FTAA and WTO negotiations. In 2004 the tariff 
level was 29.7 cents per SSE gallon for FCOJ and 17 cents for NFC (Hart, 2004) 
 
3. The Model 
 
   In the very short term, in the space of time of a supply shock and its immediate 
aftermath, cost efficiency and product differentiation are assumed to be fixed, and so one 
could not posit that market power could change based on the efficiency or differentiation 
factors.  However, the firms’ behavior (more collusive or more competitive) could 
change because of supply shocks. We can identify the firms’ reaction by specifying the 
proper econometric model based on official time series data. We construct a simultaneous 
demand and supply model based on Bresnahan (1982) to reflect the structure of the 
orange juice market by using yearly price and output data.  
       Let us suppose that demand and marginal cost are linear in the industry.  Denote the 
period t by subscript t. The demand function is assumed to be a linear function of prices 
and total income: 
 
(1) Demand function:   Qt=a0+ a1P1t+ a2Yt+ a3 P1t P3t+ a4 P2t+ a5 P3t+ε t       
   10
where Qt denotes orange amount processed in Florida each year, P1t is the average on-tree 
price of processing oranges in Florida each year (the price being generally a per box price 
for fruit which does not include costs of harvesting and transporting to the packing 
house). P2t denotes average on-tree price of fresh oranges using oranges in California
9 , 
P3t denotes the price of grapefruit for processing in the US. Yt denotes the real GDP in 
US each year. ε t  is a zero mean stochastic term.  
          The key issue here is that P3t (an exogenous variable) enters interactively with P1t, 
so that a change in Y and P3t both rotates and vertically shifts demand, so it makes  λ to 
be identified in the supply function (Bresnahan, 1982).  
Let us suppose the marginal cost of producing oranges for processing is a linear 
function of quantity, weather, and the tariff
10.  
 
(2) MCt= β0+ β1 Qt+ β2 Wt+ β3Tt+ηt      
 
                                                 
9 In the 2003 season, 83% of oranges in California were fresh-use oranges, versus 5% in 
Florida.   Overall, in the US, 23% of oranges are consumed fresh, while 77% of oranges 
are processed for juice. We consider fresh-use oranges in California and grapefruit for 
processing in the US are substitution goods for orange juice. 
10 Here we extend the demand and supply for processing oranges to demand and supply 
of orange juice. The difference between these two is just the mechanical processing 
procedure. The ratio of transforming from orange to juice is assumed to be constant (just 
for interest, that ratio happens to be roughly 2:1).    11
Here, Wt  is a  dummy variable which denotes hard freezes, 0 means no hard freeze, 1 
means hard freeze. Tt denotes the tariff level on imported frozen concentrated orange 
juice. ηt   is also a zero mean stochastic term.  
From equation (1), we get   
 
(3) MR= P1t+ əP1t(Qt)/ ə Qt· Qt= P1t + Qt /( a1+  a3 P3t )   
 
From the Cournot and Bertrand Nash equilibrium model, combining the equation 
(2) and equation (3), we get 
 
(4) P1t + λ t Qt /( a1+  a3 P3t )  = β0+ β1 Qt+ β2 Wt+ β3Tt+ηt      
 
Here λ indicates the level of market power, λ=0, means firms compete in a Bertrand 
model, perfect competition. λ=1 implies monopoly, λ=1/N, implies N firms compete in a 
Cournot model.  
        We use Q* to denote the term Qt /( a1+  a3 P3t ), and introduce the interaction term 
WQ* to capture the change of market power because of freezes. The equation (4) then 
becomes   
 
(5)  P1t =-λ1 Q t *+ β0+ β1 Q t + β2 W t - λ2W t Q t *+ β3T t +ξ t                     
 
       Thus, when a supply shocks occurs, λ= λ1 + λ2, Otherwise, λ= λ1.  By introducing the 
interaction term of supply shocks and Q*, we can estimate the market power change   12
during the supply shock, so we identify how the firms react to supply shocks, whether 
more collusive or competitive even though prices increase.  
 
 
4. Data and Estimation 
4.1. Data  
         The prices and output data from 1946 to 2003 come from the Florida Agricultural 
Statistics Service (FASS), Citrus Summary (various years) published by the Florida 
Department of Citrus. The consumer price index (CPI) was used to deflate the prices and 
GDP. The Summary statistics for the main variables are listed in Table 1, with main 
points as follows. 
         The quantity of oranges for processing increased in a general trend even though it 
varied dramatically over the sample period because of freezes and demand. The amount 
increased by four times in the past five decades while the bearing acreage increased 
nearly twice, thus suggesting that half of the production increase is from productivity 
increases, such as from technology adoption. After the 1962 catastrophic freeze, orange 
output decreased to half of previous level; a similar situation occurred after the 1980s 
several hard freezes. The major trend of the deflated price is downward in recent years, 
mainly reflecting imports of cheap orange juice bringing downward pressure on prices 
while the juice tariff was reduced step by step. In the 1930s, the citrus tariff level was 70 
cents per single strength equivalent (SSE) gallon on imported citrus juice. By 2004, the 
level was only 29.72 cents. So the real tariff level today is just 3% of the tariff in 1930 if 
we consider the inflation factor.      13
Here we should add more information about the pattern and levels of freezes. The 
freeze information comes from the “West Central Florida Freezes History” (NOAA, 
accessed 2005) in which hard freezes are defined as three hours or more of temperatures 
below 27°F and “A history of Florida citrus freezes” (Attaway,1997).  In general, a 
widespread killing freeze is defined as several hours of readings below the mid 20s, 
relatively low humidity values sufficient to prevent frost formation, and little or no 
temperature difference between flat and hilly terrain. In the “West Central Florida 
Freezes history”, five hard freezes (1962, 1977, 1983, 1985, and 1989) were listed.  
Fourteen hard freezes and six soft freezes were listed by Attaway (1997), and Attaway 
(2004) lists the six years with most destructive January freezes. But it did not mean 
freezes just affected the production of these years - because the recovery of orange trees 
requires 3-7 years. So the years affected by freezes are even more.   However, moderate 
freezes did not decrease the orange production for juice, on the contrary, soft freezes 
could increase juice orange supply a little bit because the quality of fresh use oranges 
became worse, and what would have gone for fresh (higher quality fruit) instead is 
processed. Since most oranges in Florida are for juice, soft freezes are not regarded as 
supply shocks to orange juice production.   
 
4.2. Identification and Estimation 
       From the empirical framework, we construct simultaneous equations to reflect the 
demand and supply in the orange juice market.  
(5) Demand:    Qt=a0+ a1P1t+ a2Yt+ a3 P1t P3t+ a4 P2t+ a5 P3t+ε t           
(6) Supply:       P1t =-λ1 Q t *+ β0+ β1 Q t + β2 W t - λ2W t Q t *+ β3T t +ξ t           14
 
       Since the simultaneous functions include the interaction term of endogenous 
variables (P1, Q*) and exogenous variables (P3 and W), the functions become non-linear 
functions in endogenous variables even though they are still linear in parameters. Also, 
we may treat the interaction terms as new endogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2001). 
These make the identification and estimation more complicated than the usual linear 
simultaneous equation models.  However, treating interaction terms as new endogenous 
variables does not mean we have to get more exclusive exogenous variables to make the 
equations identified. According to Fisher (1965), we can get the equations identified by 
applying rank condition to the original system without increasing the number of 
equations. If the rank conditions are satisfied, the system is identified. According to this 
principle, Wooldridge (2001) shows that a model with interactions between exogenous 
variable and endogenous variables can be identified when the model without the 
interactions is identified (Wooldridge, 2001).  So our simultaneous equations are 
identified even just having one exclusive exogenous variable in each equation. 
Essentially, we have three exogenous variables: Y, P2, and P3 in the demand function, 
which make the supply function identified. We have two exogenous variables W and T in 
the supply function which make the demand function identified. 
To non-linear simultaneous functions in endogenous variables, we should apply 
the instrumental variable procedure directly to the two equations. Otherwise, we might 
make the mistake called a “forbidden regression” which involves replacing a nonlinear 
function of an endogenous explanatory variable with the same nonlinear function of fitted 
values from the first stage estimation. The forbidden regression attempts rarely produce   15
the consistent estimation in nonlinear equations (Wooldridge, 2001). However, the choice 
of instruments for non-linear in endogenous variables is different from the usual linear 
functions. After Wooldridge (2001), we employed instruments such as the interaction 
term of P2 and P3 in estimating the demand function and P2P3, P3
2
  and Tax
2 in estimating 
the supply function. The results are in Table 3.  
Before applying 2SLS, we tested the validity of instruments variables for each 
equation; these instrument variables all significantly correlated with targeted endogenous 
variables after netting out other variables’ effects. Thus, they are proper instrument 
variables for estimating the simultaneous equations. 
 
5. Results and Interpretation 
 
   Table 3 lists the 2SLS estimation results and marginal effects of the main 
variables.  The objective of this study is to find out how the firms react to supply shocks. 
So the most interesting estimators are λ1 and λ2, the estimators are 0.82 and -0.53 
respectively. The t test of them both reaches 1% significant level.  
Thus, without the supply shock, the average market power of the growers 
association is 0.82 over the sample period (1946-2003); in other words, the associations 
(like FCM) of growers have heavy influence in the market.   However, it has not reached 
the monopoly level. That result is not surprising if we look at the history of FCM. In the 
early 1950s, the FCM set a minimum price for the citrus market in Florida since most 
growers are members of FCM. At that time, the FCM can be considered as a monopoly in 
the market. However, in 1957, the FTC announced that fixing prices prior to 1952 was a   16
violation of antitrust laws. After that, FCM still kept strong influence on the orange 
market in representing growers’ interests as noted above. .  
With supply shocks, the model tell us that market power decreased significantly, 
dropping to λ= λ1++λ2=0.29. This makes sense. When a shock occurred, the old 
equilibrium in the market was broken, new rules had not been established, and the price 
was set more freely, unconstrained by earlier accords. Another factor could be imports 
entering into the market when the price rose from the supply shock. The importers would 
not be restricted by existing accords on pricing. The price did rise, but it was just the 
result of the supply curve shifting left to reach the new equilibrium at a higher price. In 
the retail market, a similar phenomenon was observed by Binkley et al. (2001) and Dutta 
et al. (2002), who found that when a supply shock occurred (1989), the orange juice retail 
market appeared very competitive. 
         In estimating the demand function, the estimators of prices are all reasonable and 
significant, indicating that the Q* is generated based on solid ground. In estimating the 
supply function, most of the estimators are the same as we expected, except the sign of Q. 
But that sign is consistent with the phenomenon that supply increases even though the 
price declines. It could be interpreted as given that market power exists in the industry, 
the industry is still profitable despite the price decline. More and more firms enter the 
market despite the price decrease.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we employed a simultaneous model to study how the orange juice 
market reacts to exogenous shocks. We found that when shocks occurred, the market   17
became more competitive even though the price rises. An implication is that consumers 
receive some compensation for natural disasters through the market reaction: firms 
become more competitive(and cede part of their profit), which dampens the potential 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables 
Variables Observations  mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Q  58  118163 58875  19220 232900 
P1  58    0.64 0.35 0.23 1.90 
P2  58  1.11 0.46 0.27 2.15 
P3 58  0.27  0.20  -0.027
11 0.906 
Note: P1, P2, P3 are prices deflated by CPI. (1934 is the base year) 
 
Table 2: Historic Freezes in Florida (Orlando area) 
Year Low 
temperature 
Level Year  Low 
temperature




◦ S  1970  24
◦ S  Dec,1985  26
◦ M 
1947 24
◦ M/S  1971  22
◦ S  1986  27
◦ M 
1957 21
◦ M/S  1977  20
◦ S  Feb,1989  29
◦ M 
Jan,1958 26
◦ S  1981  18




◦ S  1982  23
◦ S  Jan,1996  29
◦ M 
1962 19
◦ Ca  1983  24
◦ S  Feb,1996  26
◦ M 
1966 23
◦ M  Jan,1985 19
◦ S       
Source:  “A history of Florida citrus freeze” (Attaway, 1997) 
M means the damage level is moderate, S means severe, Ca means catastrophic damage.  
   
 
                                                 
11 The price is on-tree price of grapefruit in the US, The definition of on-tree price is price minus costs of 
harvesting and transporting to the packing house. So a negative price means the price which growers got is 
too low to offset the costs.  This situation happened in 1998 and 2003. (Source: Florida citrus summary)   20
 
Table 3 Estimation Results 
variables Demand 
function 





-87692    
GDP 220.3*** 
(8.82) 
220.3    
P1P3 30667 
(0.57) 
    
P2 21833 
(1.55) 
21833    
P 3 9734 
(0.21) 
29514    
Q*     -0.82** 
(1.95) 
 
Q     -7.2e-06 
(1.61) 
-1.4e-05 




WQ*     0.53*** 
(3.04) 
 










2 0.79    0.728   
Absolute t value in brackets.   
***  indicates the 1% significant level, ** indicates the 5% significant level,  
*  indicates the 10% significant level. 
 
 
 
 
 